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The intention of this research is to justify deployment of quasigroups in cryptography,
especially with new quasigroup based cryptographic hash function NaSHA as a runner in
the First round of the ongoing NIST SHA-3 competition. We present new method for fast
generation of huge quasigroup operations, based on the so-called extended Feistel networks and
modification of the Sade’s diagonal method. We give new design of quasigroup based family
of cryptographic hash functions - NaSHA, which deploy the new method and with a novel
approach - different quasigroups for every application of component quasigroup transformations
in every iteration of the compression function and, much more, the used quasigroups are
functions of the processed message block.
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1. Introduction
This thesis is the final result of four years of research done in the Institute
of Informatics at ”Ss Cyril and Methodius” University in Republic of Macedonia.
In the following sequel we give the motivation and our research goals.
The most known constructions of the cryptographic primitives, error de-
tecting and error correcting codes use structures from the associative algebra as
groups, rings and fields. Two eminent specialists on quasigroups, J. De´nes and
A. D. Keedwell [2], once proclaimed the advent of a new era in cryptology, con-
sisting in the application of non-associative algebraic systems as quasigroups and
neo-fields. The quasigroups and their combinatorial equivalent Latin squares are
very suitable for this aim, because of their structure, their features, their big
number and because they lead to particular simple and yet efficient primitives.
Nevertheless, at present, very few researchers use these tools and cryptographic
community still hesitate about them.
On October 9, 2007 NIST announced the request for candidate algorithm
nominations for a new cryptographic SHA-3 hash algorithm family. The reason
were Wang′s differential attacks [4, 3] on SHA-1 from 2005. The last standard -
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SHA-2 hash functions are in the same general family of hash functions as SHA-1.
They could potentially be attacked with similar techniques, but they are much
stronger than SHA-1.
With this thesis we wanted to justify deployment of quasigroups in cryp-
tography, especially with new quasigroup based cryptographic hash function as
a runner in the NIST SHA-3 competition. Several questions were raised, as: (1)
What kind of quasigroups are suitable for cryptographic purposes? (2) How to
generate and how to compute fast operation of huge quasigroups? (3) What
kind of features have huge quasigroups obtained by new construction method?
(4) Do some old or new quasigroup transformations exist that can use quasi-
groups obtained by new method? (5) Design of cryptographic primitives with
quasigroup transformations.
In the following sections we will present, without proofs, some of the
main results of this thesis.
2. How to choose a quasigroup?
In a quasigroup based cryptography you can find that different authors
are seeking quasigroups with different properties. One needs CI−quasigroups,
the other needs multivariate quadratic quasigroups, the third needs quasigroups
with less possible structure, the fourth needs exponential quasigroups, the fifth
needs orthogonal quasigroups etc. Some cryptographic primitives need special
kind of quasigroups. There are special cryptosystems build on some particular
subsets of quasigroups. Our interest is to find what properties should have a
quasigroup in order to be used as a non-linear building block in cryptographic
primitives and to be able to contribute to the defence against linear and differ-
ential attacks. When we try to find quasigroups suitable for cryptography in
this sense, we started from shapeless quasigroups, defined by Gligoroski et al.
[6].
Definition 1. [6] A quasigroup (Q, ∗) of order r is said to be shapeless iff it
is non-idempotent, non-commutative, non-associative, it does not have neither
left nor right unit, it does not contain proper sub-quasigroups, and there is no
k < 2r for which identities of the kinds are satisfied:
(2.1) x(... ∗ (x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
∗y)) = y, y = ((y ∗ x) ∗ ...) ∗ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
Shapeless quasigroups are a good choice, but sometimes even a quasi-
group with some structure is preferable (when the structure does not affect the
security). In other cases quasigroups with additional restriction to the structure
may be needed, for example, not to be either semisymmetric or Stein quasi-
group or Schroeder quasigroup, etc. Most often quasigroups are used for creat-
ing quasigroup transformations, and for them, usually it is enough a quasigroup
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to be shapeless. Some quasigroup transformations, like A and RA, even defined
by linear quasigroups [5], can produce non-linear Boolean functions [11]. Some
quasigroup transformations, like E transformation, preserve linearity of the used
quasigroup [11]. At the end, it is important the quasigroup string transforma-
tions to be non-linear Boolean functions without any linear component Boolean
function, without nontrivial difference propagations with prop ratio 1 and re-
striction weight of 0 and with every nonzero output selection vector correlated
to more than one input selection vector.
3. Fast generation of huge quasigroup operations
We introduced the so called extended Feistel networks (which are Feistel
networks with additional properties) as orthomorphisms to define huge quasi-
groups [8]. A Feistel network [15] takes any function and transforms it into a
bijection, so it is a commonly used technique for creating a non-linear crypto-
graphic function. Using a Feistel network for creating a huge quasigroup is not
a novel approach. Kristen [14] presents several different constructions using one
or two Feistel networks and isotopies of quasigroups. Complete mappings, intro-
duced by Mann [13] (the equivalent concept of orthomorphism was introduced
explicitly in [12]), are also useful for creation of huge quasigroups. In [14] com-
plete mappings with non-affine functions represented by Cayley tables or with
affine functions represented by binary transformations, are used for that aim.
The main disadvantages of the previously mentioned constructions are the lack
of efficiency in one case and the lack of security in the other case. Namely, the
Cayley table representations need a lot of memory, and also the affine functions
do not have good cryptographic properties.
Our approach uses the extended Feistel networks as orthomorphisms, to
generate huge quasigroups of order R = 2s2
t
. We only need to store small
permutations of order 2s, s = 4, 8, 16. We use the generalization of Sade’s
diagonal method [10] to the complete mappings and the orthomorphisms, given
by the following Theorem. For the Abelian group (Zn2 ,⊕n) they are equivalent
with Sade’s diagonal method.
Theorem 1. Let φ be a complete mapping of the admissible group (G,+) and
let θ be an orthomorphism associated to φ. Define an operations ◦ and • on G
by:
(3.1) x ◦ y = φ(y − x) + y
(3.2) x • y = θ(x− y) + y
where x, y ∈ G. Then (G, ◦) and (G, •) are quasigroups.
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Definition 2. Let (G,+) be an Abelian group, let f : G→ G be a mapping and
let a, b, c ∈ G are constants. The extended Feistel network Fa,b,c : G2 → G2
created by f is defined for every l, r ∈ G by
Fa,b,c(l, r) = (r + a, l + b+ f(r + c)).
The extended Feistel network Fa,b,c is a bijection with inverse
F−1a,b,c(l, r) = (r − b− f(l + c− a), l − a).
One of the main results of this thesis, that we will frequently use, is the following
one.
Theorem 2. Let (G,+) be an Abelian group and a, b, c ∈ G. If Fa,b,c : G2 → G2
is an extended Feistel network created by a bijection f : G → G, then Fa,b,c is
an orthomorphism of the group (G2,+).
In the sequel we will consider only extended Feistel networks of the
Abelian groups (Zn2 ,⊕n).
Proposition 3.1. Let a, b, c ∈ Zk2 and let Fa,b,c : Z2k2 → Z2k2 be an extended
Feistel network of the group (Z2k2 ,⊕2k) created by a mapping f : Zk2 → Zk2.
Then Fa,b,c is affine iff f is affine.
Proposition 3.2. Let f, g : Zk2 → Zk2 be bijections, a, b, c, a′, b′, c′ ∈ Zk2 and let
Fa,b,c, Fa′,b′,c′ : Z
2k
2 → Z2k2 be extended Feistel networks of the group (Z2k2 ,⊕2k),
created by f and g respectfully. Then the composite function Fa,b,c ◦ Fa′,b′,c′ is a
complete mapping and orthomorphism on Z2k2 too.
Corollary 1. If Fa,b,c is an extended Feistel network of the group (Z
2k
2 ,⊕2k)
created by bijection f , then F 2a,b,c is a complete mapping and orthomorphism
too.
The following Theorem shows us that extended Feistel network Fa,b,c has
the same algebraic degree as its starting bijection f .
Theorem 3. Let f : Zk2 → Zk2 be a bijection of algebraic degree deg(f) ≥ 1 and
let Fa,b,c : Z
2k
2 → Z2k2 be an extended Feistel network of the group (Z2k2 ,⊕2k),
created by f . Then deg(Fa,b,c) = deg(f).
Here is a method for definition of huge quasigroups from small bijection.
Algorithm (Creation of extended Feistel network of order 22
r
)
Step 1 Take a suitable non-affine bijection of desired algebraic degree f : Z2
t
2 →
Z
2t
2 where t < r is a small positive integer (t = 2, 3, 4). Let f
′ = f and k = t.
Step 2 Create Extended Feistel network Fa,b,c : Z
2k+1
2 → Z2
k+1
2 for some
a, b, c ∈ Z2k2 using f ′ as starting bijection. Let f ′ = Fa,b,c and k = k + 1.
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Step 3 If k < r, go to step 2 else output the f ′.
In applications one needs effectively constructed quasigroups of order
2256, 2512,21024, . . . . A huge quasigroup of order 22
r
can now be designed as
it follows. Take a suitable non-affine bijection of desired algebraic degree f :
Z2
2t → Z22t , where t < r is a small positive integer (t = 2, 3, 4). We use the
previous algorithm and we obtain F as the output extended Feistel network of
order 22
r
. Define a quasigroup operation ◦ on the set Z22r by 3.2, i.e.,
x ◦ y = F (x⊕ y)⊕ y, for every x, y ∈ Z22r .
Note that we need only r − t iterations for getting F and a small amount of
memory for storing the bijection f . Hence, the complexity of our algorithm for
construction of quasigroups of order 22
r
is O(log(log r)).
Example 1. We use a starting bijection f : Z42 → Z42. So, t = 2. We
choose constants (a(i), b(i), c(i)) = (i, 0, 0) ∈ Z22t+i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 7. Now we can
construct the following orthomorphisms, where li, ri ∈ Zi2, i = 4, 8, 16, . . . :
F
(1)
1,0,0 : Z
8
2 → Z82 as F (1)1,0,0(l4, r4) = ((r4 ⊕4 1), (l4 ⊕4 f(r4))),
F
(2)
2,0,0 : Z
16
2 → Z162 as F (2)2,0,0(l8, r8) = ((r8 ⊕8 2), (l8 ⊕8 F (1)1,0,0(r8))),
F
(3)
3,0,0 : Z
32
2 → Z322 as F (3)3,0,0(l16, r16) = ((r16 ⊕16 3), (l16 ⊕16 F (2)2,0,0(r16))),
F
(4)
4,0,0 : Z
64
2 → Z642 as F (4)4,0,0(l32, r32) = ((r32 ⊕32 4), (l32 ⊕32 F (3)3,0,0(r32))),
F
(5)
5,0,0 : Z
128
2 → Z1282 as F (5)5,0,0(l64, r64) = ((r64 ⊕64 5), (l64 ⊕64 F (4)4,0,0(r64))),
F
(6)
6,0,0 : Z
256
2 → Z2562 as F (6)6,0,0(l128, r128) = ((r128 ⊕128 6), (l128 ⊕128 F (5)5,0,0(r128))),
F
(7)
7,0,0 : Z
512
2 → Z5122 as F (7)7,0,0(l256, r256) = ((r256 ⊕256 7), (l256 ⊕256 F (6)6,0,0(r256))).
So we need 7 = 9− 2 iterations for getting F (7)7,0,0 : Z5122 → Z5122 .
Further on in this section we consider the algebraic properties of the
quasigroups obtained by the above mentioned algorithm. For that aim we take
a somewhat simplified situation when f : Zk2 → Zk2 is a bijection and Fa,b,c :
Z
2k
2 → Z2k2 is an extended Feistel network created by f . We denote by (Q, ◦)
the quasigroup on the set Q = Z2k2 derived by the orthomorphism Fa,b,c.
Proposition 3.3. The quasigroup (Q, ◦) is non-idempotent iff f(c) 6= b or
a 6= 0.
Proposition 3.4. The equality
(3.3) (x ◦ y) ◦ (y ◦ x) = x
is an identity in (Q, ◦), i.e. (Q, ◦) is a Schroeder quasigroup.
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Corollary 2. The quasigroup (Q, ◦) is non-commutative and, much more, no
different elements of Q commutes.
Proposition 3.5. The quasigroup (Q, ◦) has neither left nor right unit.
Proposition 3.6. If a 6= 0, or f(c) 6= b, or φ◦Fa,b,c(x) 6= Fa,b,c ◦φ(x) for some
x 6= 0 ∈ Q, then the quasigroup (Q, ◦) is non-associative.
Proposition 3.7. a) The identity
y = ((y ◦ x) ◦ . . . ) ◦ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
holds true in (Q, ◦) iff F la,b,c = I.
b) The identity
x ◦ (· · · ◦ (x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
◦y)) = y
holds true in (Q, ◦) iff φl = I, where φ = I ⊕2k Fa,b,c.
Regarding the subquasigroups of the quasigroup (Q, ◦), we notice the
following property, where < A > denotes the subquasigroup generated by the
subset A of Q.
Proposition 3.8. < 0 >=< {θi(0)| i = 1, 2, . . . } > .
Proposition 3.9. The quasigroup (Q, •), created by an affine orthomorphism
θ of a group (Zn2 ,⊕n) is totally anti-symmetric (TA-quasigroup).
So, even affine extended Feistel network can find some application also,
for example, for creating TA-quasigroups that can be used for the definition of
the check digit systems, where the early typing errors have to be recognized.
4. Cryptographic hash function NaSHA
We use the quasigroup transformationMT for definition of a new family
of hash functions NaSHA-(m,k, r) [7]. The parameters m, k and r denote
the length of the output hash result (the message digest), the complexity of
MT and the order 22r of used quasigroup respectively, so k is a positive even
integer and m and r are positive integers. We showed that, the transformation
MT : Qt → Qt can be considered as a one-way function when Q = Z2n is
enough big.
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NaSHA-(m,k, r) hash algorithm
Input: A positive even integer k and positive integers m and r
such that m > 2r, and an input message M .
Output: A hash value NaSHA-(m,k, r)(M) of m bits.
1. Denote by n the smallest integer such that m ≤ 2n.
(For example, n=8 for m=224 and n=9 for m=384.)
2. Pad the message M, so that the length of the padded message M ′ is
a multiple of 2n+1, |M ′| = 2n+1N for some N .
Separate M ′ in N 2n+1-bit blocks, M ′ =M1||M2|| . . . ||MN , |Mi| = 2
n+1.
3. Initialize the initial value H0, which is a 2
n+1-bit word.
4. The first message block M1 and the initial value H0
separate to q = 2n−r+1 2r-bits words:
M1 = S1||S3||S5|| . . . ||S2q−3||S2q−1,
H0 = S2||S4||S6|| . . . ||S2q−2||S2q , (|Si| = 2
r) and form the word
S(0) = S1||S2||S3||S4|| . . . ||S2q−3||S2q−2||S2q−1||S2q .
5. Choose leaders li as functions that depend on S1, S2, S3, . . . , S2q
and a suitable linear transformation LinTr2n+2 .
6. Choose two quasigroups ({0, 1}2
r
, ∗1) and ({0, 1}
2r , ∗2)
(one for A and one for RA transformation)
and compute the string of bits S(N−1) as follows:
for i = 1 to N − 1 do
A1||A2||A3|| . . . ||A2q ←MT (LinTr
2q
2n+2
(S(i−1)))
B1||B2||B3|| . . . ||Bq−1||Bq ←Mi+1,
S(i) := B1||A2||B2||A4|| . . . ||Bq−1||A2q−2||Bq ||A2q ,
end
7. Choose two quasigroups ({0, 1}2
r
, ∗1) and ({0, 1}
2r , ∗2) and compute
MT (LinTr2q
2n+2
(S(N−1))) := A1||A2||A3|| . . . ||A2q . Then
NaSHA-(m,k, r)(M) = A4||A8|| . . . ||A2q−4||A2q (mod 2
m).
We give a complete implementation of NaSHA-(m, 2, 6) algorithm where
m ∈ {224, 256, 384, 512} in [7]. It supports internal state sizes of 1024 and 2048
bits, and arbitrary output sizes between 125 and 512 bits. The used quasigroups
of order 22
6
= 264 are constructed by extended Feistel networks, because they
allow to insert tunable parameters in their definition. We used that feature to
obtain the novel design: different quasigroups for every application of component
quasigroup transformations in every iteration of the compression function and,
much more, the used quasigroups are functions of the processed message block.
This implementation has been accepted as a 1st Round candidate in the SHA-3
competition of The American National Institute of Standards and Technology,
NIST, but did not pass to the 2nd Round. Some improvements are given in [9].
We obtain performance of up to 23.06 cycles per byte on an Intel Core 2 Duo
in 64-bit mode.
In the implementation, as a starting bijection f : Z82 → Z82 we use an
improved AES S-box with the APA structure from Cui and Cao [1]. From the
starting bijection f we define three extended Feistel networks Fa1,b1,c1, Fa2,b2,c2,
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Fa3,b3,c3 : Z
16
2 → Z162 by
Fai,bi,ci(l8||r8) = (r8 ⊕ ai)||(l8 ⊕ bi ⊕ f(r8 ⊕ ci)),
where l8 and r8 are 8-bit variables, and ai, bi, ci are 8-bit words that are defined
before each application of MT . Denote by f ′ the bijection Fa1,b1,c1 ◦ Fa2,b2,c2 ◦
Fa3,b3,c3 : Z
16
2 → Z162 .
By using the bijection f ′ we define a quasigroup operation on Z642 which
is going to be used for the additive string transformation A as follows. Create
the Feistel networks Fα1,β1,γ1 : Z
32
2 → Z322 and FA1,B1,C1 : Z642 → Z642 by
Fα1,β1,γ1(l16||r16) = (r16 ⊕ α1)||(l16 ⊕ β1 ⊕ f ′(r16 ⊕ γ1)),
FA1,B1,C1(l32||r32) = (r32 ⊕A1)||(l32 ⊕B1 ⊕ Fα1,β1,γ1(r32 ⊕ C1)),
where l16, r16 are 16-bit variables, α1, β1, γ1 are 16-bit words, l32, r32 are 32-bit
variables and A1, B1, C1 are 32-bit words. The constant words will be defined
latter. The function FA1,B1,C1 is an orthomorphism (complete mapping) in the
group (Z642 ,⊕), and then the operation defined by
x ∗a1,b1,c1,a2,b2,c2,a3,b3,c3,α1,β1,γ1,A1,B1,C1 y = FA1,B1,C1(x⊕ y)⊕ y
is a quasigroup operation in Z642 .
By using the bijection f ′ we define also a quasigroup operation in Z642
which is going to be used for the reverse additive string transformation RA as
follows. Create the Feistel networks Fα2,β2,γ2 : Z
32
2 → Z322 and FA2,B2,C2 : Z642 →
Z
64
2 by
Fα2,β2,γ2(l16||r16) = (r16 ⊕ α2)||(l16 ⊕ β2 ⊕ f ′(r16 ⊕ γ2)),
FA2,B2,C2(l32||r32) = (r32 ⊕A2)||(l32 ⊕B2 ⊕ Fα2,β2,γ2(r32 ⊕ C2)),
where l16, r16 are 16-bit variables, α2, β2, γ2 are 16-bit words, l32, r32 are 32-bit
variables and A2, B2, C2 are 32-bit words. The constant words will be defined
later. The function FA2,B2,C2 is an orthomorphism (complete mapping) in the
group (Z642 ,⊕), and then the operation defined by
x ∗a1,b1,c1,a2,b2,c2,a3,b3,c3,α2,β2,γ2,A2,B2,C2 y = FA2,B2,C2(x⊕ y)⊕ y
is a quasigroup operation in Z642 .
Before every computationMT (S1||S2||S3|| . . . ||S2q−1||S2q), where Si are
64-bit words, we define the 64-bit leaders l1 of RA and l2 of A, the 8-bit words
a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3, the 16-bit words α1, β1, γ1, α2, β2, γ2 and the 32-bit
words A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, C2.
For m = 224 and 256, necessary definitions are:
l1 = S1 + S2, l2 = S3 + S4,
a1||b1||c1||a2||b2||c2||a3||b3 = S5 + S6, c3 = a1
α1||β1||γ1||α2 = S7 + S8, β2||γ2 = (S9 + S10)(mod 232),
A1||B1 = S11 + S12, C1||A2 = S13 + S14, B2||C2 = S15 + S16.
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For m = 384 and 512, necessary definitions are (this is improved version,
suggested in [9]):
l1 = S1 + S2 + S28 + S30, l2 = S3 + S4 + S29 + S31,
a1||b1||c1||a2||b2||c2||a3||b3 = S5 + S6 + S17 + S18, c3 = a1
α1||β1||γ1||α2 = S7 + S8 + S19 + S20,
β2||γ2 = (S9 + S10 + S21 + S22)(mod 232),
A1||B1 = S11 + S12 + S23 + S27, C1||A2 = S13 + S14 + S24 + S26,
B2||C2 = S15 + S16 + S25 + S32.
Here, the addition + is modulo 264.
The linear transformations are given as follows. Denote by LinTr512 and
by LinTr256 the transformations of the sets {0, 1}2028 and {0, 1}1024 respectively,
defined by
LinTr512(S1||S2|| . . . ||S31||S32) = (S7 ⊕ S15 ⊕ S25 ⊕ S32)||S1||S2|| . . . ||S31,
LinTr256(S1||S2|| . . . ||S15||S16) = (S4 ⊕ S7 ⊕ S10 ⊕ S16)||S1||S2|| . . . ||S15,
where Si are 64-bits words, ⊕ denotes the operation XOR on 64-bits words, and
the operation || denotes the concatenation of words.
For more information about NaSHA, see [7].
5. Future work
In the future we plan an examination of quasigroups produced by Ex-
tended Feistel networks of other Abelian groups. Also we plan to use them in
the design of quasigroup based block cipher.
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